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F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994).
The court concluded that these
factors favored granting costs and
attorneys' fees in the instant case.
The court reasoned that awarding
fees in this case may send a warning
to BBS operators like Sherman and
may prevent future copyright
infringements from occurring. The
court admitted that unchecked
copyright infringement could
become rampant, resulting in a
negative impact on the software
market.
Monetary recovery for
trademark infringement
Because Sherman's willful
infringement constituted counterfeit-
ing, the court held that Sega could
receive treble damages or profits and
reasonable attorneys' fees. Although
Sega provided no evidence regard-
ing damages or profits, the court
concluded that if Sega decided to
prove actual damages or lost profits,
the Chief Magistrate Judge would
hear the matter. The court ordered
Sega to inform the court and
Sherman of its decision within one
week after the date of the order;
otherwise, the court would enter
judgment..
Electronic links via Internet constitute sufficient
contacts for personal jurisdiction
by Heather Sullivan
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in CompuServe v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), held that a
Texas resident, who subscribed to a computer informa-
tion and network service and employed that service to
market computer software, is subject to personal
jurisdiction in the service's home state even where
contacts with that state are mostly electronic. The court
limited its holding to the issue at hand, because this case
is relatively unique and probably the first of many
similar cases to follow due to the rise in business and
communication through the Internet. In this particular
case, the court held: (1) the subscriber purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of doing business in
Ohio; (2) the action arose from the subscriber's contacts
with the state; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion is reasonable due to the substantial connection
between the defendant's acts and the state of Ohio.
CompuServe ("CompuServe") is a computer infor-
mation service with headquarters in Ohio which
provides access to computing and information services
via the Internet. CompuServe is currently the second
largest provider on the "information super highway."
Individual subscribers contract with CompuServe to
gain electronic access to more than 1,700 information
services. CompuServe also provides computer software
products to its subscribers. This software may be a
product of CompuServe or other parties. Products
distributed in this manner are referred to as "shareware."
This software makes money through the voluntary
cooperation of an "end user"-another CompuServe
subscriber who pays the creator's suggested licensing
fee if he or she decides to use the software beyond a
certain trial period. The fee is paid directly to
CompuServe in Ohio. CompuServe charges 15% for its
trouble before it transfers the balance to the shareware's
creator.
CompuServe files declaratory judgment
action denying trademark infringement
Richard Patterson, the defendant, was a subscriber of
CompuServe. Patterson, a resident of Houston, claimed
to have never visited Ohio, where CompuServe is
located. Patterson placed items of "shareware" on
CompuServe for use and purchase. As a shareware
provider, Patterson entered into a Shareware Registra-
tion Agreement ("SRA") which incorporated two other
agreements: the CompuServe Service Agreement
("Service Agreement") and the Rules of Operation.
Thus, Patterson and CompuServe entered into an
independent contractor relationship. The SRA permitted
Patterson to place software he created on the
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CompuServe system. CompuServe provided subscribers
with access to software or shareware that Patterson
created.
Both the SRA and the Service Agreement expressly
stated that parties entered into the contract in the State of
Ohio, and the Service Agreement stipulated that Ohio
law governs the contract. The SRA also asked new
shareware providers to type "AGREE" at certain points
in the document to show recognition of terms and
conditions in the contract. Patterson assented to the
agreement at his own computer in Texas and transmitted
this assent to the CompuServe computer system in Ohio.
From 1991 to 1994, Patterson electronically transmit-
ted thirty-two master software files to CompuServe. The
CompuServe system in Ohio stored the files and made
them available to CompuServe subscribers. The sub-
scribers could then download the files into their comput-
ers and pay for them if they so chose at the end of the
trial period. Patterson designed his software to help
people navigate their way around the larger Internet
network and marketed it through advertisements on the
CompuServe system. Subsequently, CompuServe
marketed a like product with names and markings that
Patterson believed were similar to his own. Patterson
notified CompuServe by electronic mail that these terms
were his and (his company) FlashPoint Development's
trademarks.
CompuServe changed the programs names. Patterson
continued to claim trademark infringement and decep-
tive practices, and demanded a $100,000 settlement.
CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the
federal district court of the Southern District of Ohio,
relying on diversity subject matter jurisdiction.
CompuServe sought a declaratory judgment to hold that
it did not infringe on the trademarks or trade names of
Patterson or Flashpoint Development and, thus, was not
guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices. Patterson
responded with a motion to dismiss on several grounds,
including lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
held that the electronic links between the Texan defen-
dant and CompuServe, located in Ohio, were "too
tenuous to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction."
The district court also denied CompuServe's motion for
reconsideration.
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the implications and
effects of global-shrinking trends in business and
communication on jurisdiction. The court recognized the
increasing nationalization of commerce and communica-
tion which results in the relaxation of limits that the due
process clause imposes on the court's jurisdiction. The
Internet is an example of these developments. Business
people, like Patterson, can easily operate international
business from a desktop. However, the court emphasized
that business people are still entitled to some assurance
under due process that their conduct will not render
them liable to suit.
The Ohio long-arm statute allows an Ohio court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents of Ohio
on claims arising from nonresidents transacting business
in Ohio. CompuServe based its cause of action on
Patterson's act of sending computer software to Ohio for
sale and service to establish specific personal jurisdic-
tion. The court of appeals looked to the inquiry applied
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington to determine
whether, given the facts of the case, the nonresident
defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state
such that the court's exercise of jurisdiction would
comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). To determine if Patterson
had sufficient contacts with Ohio, the court broke down
its analysis into three criteria: (1) the defendant must
have purposefully availed himself of the benefits of
Ohio; (2) the cause of action must have arisen from the
defendant's activities in Ohio; and (3) the acts of the
defendant must have had a substantial connection with
the forum in order to make the exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant reasonable. See Reynolds v. int'l
Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1116 (6th Cir.
1994).
Acts of CompuServe subscriber satisfy
"purposeful availment test"
The district court ruled that the connections between
Patterson and CompuServe were not substantial because
they were marked by a minimal course of dealing and
were, therefore, insufficient to satisfy the purposeful
availment test. In examining the facts, the court of
appeals disagreed, believing the connections were
substantial, and that Patterson could have reasonably
anticipated being brought into an Ohio court.
The court emphasized that the relationship between
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Patterson and CompuServe was crucial to the case.
Patterson subscribed to CompuServe and entered into a
SRA when he loaded his software onto.CompuServe's
system for the public's use and purchase. After Patterson
performed these acts, he was notified that he had made
contacts with an Ohio-based company which would be
governed by Ohio law. Patterson continuously sent
software via electronic links to the CompuServe system
in Ohio and advertised and sold his products through the
CompuServe system. He chose to transmit his software
from Texas to CompuServe's system in Ohio. Further-
more, Patterson initiated the events that led to the filing
of this lawsuit through electronic mail messages.
The court also considered the continuing relationship
between Patterson and CompuServe. The relationship
was intended to be ongoing and not a "one-shot affair."
Patterson sent software to CompuServe consistently for
three years and intended to continue marketing his
software on CompuServe. The court found that
Patterson "deliberately set in motion an ongoing
marketing relationship with CompuServe and he should
have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have
consequences in Ohio." CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265.
The court conceded that to establish personal
jurisdiction, an individual must go beyond merely
injecting the software product into the stream of
commerce. However, Patterson both placed his product
into the stream of commerce and purposefully directed
his activities toward the state of Ohio. The court
described CompuServe as a distributor of Patterson who
repeatedly sent "goods" to Ohio for ultimate sale.
The court also disagreed with the district court's
statement that the amount of sales made by Patterson
was de minimis. The court of appeals declared that the
true measure of purposeful availment is the quality of
contacts rather than the number or status of such
contacts. Again, the court stated that Patterson's contacts
were knowing and continuous, even if little revenue
came from Ohio itself. In addition, the court not only
focused on sales in Ohio, but also on those sales made
by way of CompuServe's system in Ohio. Taking these
factors into account, the court stated that Patterson
purposefully availed himself to the privilege of doing
business in Ohio. He knowingly reached out to Ohio and
benefited from CompuServe's services in handling his
software and the resulting fees.
Subscriber's claims arose out of contacts
with Ohio
The court also stated that CompuServe's claims
against Patterson arose out of his contacts with Ohio.
The district court held that the existence of Patterson's
software on the Compuserve system in Ohio was
incidental to the dispute because Patterson could claim
trademark protection against CompuServe even if he had
placed his software on another network or in a retail
store. The court of appeals disagreed and pointed out
that Patterson marketed his product exclusively on the
CompuServe system; thus, any trademark Patterson
might have had would have been created in Ohio, and
any violation by CompuServe would have occurred, at
least in part, in Ohio. Furthermore, CompuServe's
declaratory judgment action arose because Patterson
threatened, via electronic and regular mail, to seek an
injunction against CompuServe's product sales or to
seek damages if CompuServe did not pay to settle his
claim. In the court's opinion, such threats by Patterson
constituted contacts with Ohio and gave rise to this case.
Court finds exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable
Finally, the court determined whether exercising
jurisdiction over Patterson would be reasonable and
'comport with 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117 (quoting
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
113 (1987)). The court considered several factors: (1)
"the burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the
forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief;
and (4) the interest of the several states in securing the
most efficient resolution of controversies." American
Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir.
1988) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)).
As to the defendant's burden, the court conceded that
it may be burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in
Ohio. However, the court noted that Patterson knew
through his agreements with CompuServe that he was
making a connection with Ohio in hope such an agree-
ment would work to his benefit.
Furthermore, the State of Ohio generally expresses
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interest in resolving disputes in which an Ohio company
is a party because the suits involve Ohio law trade
names and trademarks claims. More than $10 million
may be at stake, and the result of the case would have an
impact on CompuServe's relationships with other
shareware providers. The court found the relationship
between Patterson and Ohio substantial enough and,
therefore, reasonable for an Ohio court to assert personal
jurisdiction over Patterson.
The court limited its holding to the circumstances in
this case. Further, the court, noting the emergence of
communications and business on the Internet, explained
the potential of additional lawsuits, and other related
issues, on the horizon, which will need to be resolved in
the future. The court stressed that it did not hold that
Patterson would be subject to lawsuits in states where
his software was purchased or used or where his
software might have caused a "computer virus." In
addition, the court's holding did not extend to a situation
where CompuServe would attempt to sue any subscriber
for nonpayment of its services in Ohio. In reversing the
district court's dismissal, the court of appeals held that
people like Patterson who employ a computer network
service to market a product can reasonably expect to
resolve lawsuits in the state where the service's head-
quarters is located.-
World Wide Web site does not create personal
jurisdiction
by Allison E. Cahill
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed a claim of
trademark infringement for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The court
held that the creation of a World
Wide Web site is not an offer to sell
in New York. Thus, New York's
long arm statute does not apply. The
court further held that "even if
personal jurisdiction was proper
under the long arm statute, the
assertion of personal jurisdiction
would violate due process."
Bensusan, a New York Corpora-
tion which owns "The Blue Note"
jazz club in New York City, brought
suit alleging that Richard B. King
("King") infringed on the Blue Note
trademark by posting a site on the
World Wide Web to promote a
Missouri jazz club which he owned.
King moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
In April 1996, King posted a
general access site on the Internet.
The site contained a disclaimer, a
calendar of events, and names and
addresses of ticket outlets in
Columbia, Missouri. The disclaimer
stated that "[tihe Blue Note's
Cyberspot should not be confused
with one of the world's finest jazz
club[s] [the] Blue Note, located in
the heart of New York's Greenwich
Village." This site also contained a
hyperlink, which allows Internet
users to connect to Bensusan's Blue
Note site.
Providing information
about the product is not a
sale
Bensusan argued that the tortious
act provisions of New York's long
arm statute established personal
jurisdiction over King. N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 302 (a)(2), (a)(3)(ii). Section
302(a)(2) of New York's long arm
statute ("Section 302 (a)(2)")
provides that personal jurisdiction
may be found if one not domiciled
in New York "commits a tortious act
within the state" and the plaintiff's
cause of action arises from this act.
The Second Circuit, in Vanity Fair
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